Field of Science

Showing posts with label class notes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label class notes. Show all posts

Class Notes: Verb Islands

This is one of several posts based on readings and discussion from a graduate seminar on language acquisition that I have been attending.

Modern syntactic theory is complex. When I diagrammed sentences in middle school, it looked something like this diagram from A Walk in the WoRds blog:



That seemed complicated at the time but is child's play compared with what one finds in many syntax papers. For instance, here is a tree from Beatrice Santorini & Anthony Kroch's syntax textbook:



Here's another one from Christopher Davis's online class notes at UMass-Amherst:



Something that pops out about these trees are the various symbols that don't seem to do anything. For instance, saying "smelly dog" involves and adjective and a noun makes sense, but in Davis's tree above, there are extra symbols such as A'. The Santorini & Kroch tree makes considerable use of "inflectional phrases," which weren't a part of the sentence diagrams I learned in school.

Is grammar really so complex?

For a number of years now, Michael Tomasello has been arguing that perhaps linguistic structure is not nearly so complex and does not require nearly so many abstract components (like inflectional phrases), particularly in the case of child speech. A lot of the abstraction in linguistic theory is meant to explain how you know what constructions a given word appears in. For instance, compare the sentences below:

(1) Sarah rolled the orange.
(2) The orange rolled.
(3) Sarah ate the orange.
(4) *The orange ate.

The fourth sentence should sound ungrammatical (which is what the asterisk means). The question is: how do you know that the verb roll can be used in this way but the verb eat cannot? Theories make use of abstract grammatical structure to explain these and other generalizations (the abstractions in the sentence trees at the top of this post are motivated by other considerations, but the idea is the same).

Tomasello's point is that in fact young children and even adults typically do not use words in a wide variety of constructions -- therefore, you don't actually need such abstract linguistic theories. This is a useful push-back, and the claim has generated a lot of research. It is interesting, however, that Tomasello is presenting a theory that explains what people do say, but he is arguing against theories that explain what people can say, which turn out to be quite different things. Although nobody is likely to say the sentence in (5), we all know that it is grammatical.

(5) We all shall have told the story to the Martians.

A complete theory needs to explain that phenomenon, too.

More on spoken language

Part of Tomasello's argument is that an abstract grammar would predict more variability in the constructions people (particularly children) actually use than are seen in real life. Charles Yang has recently argued that this is not the case (see Who's Afraid of George Kingsley Zipf). In fact, people are very repetitive. Moreover, even if a given word can be used in many constructions, there may be no reason to use all those constructions. Sentence (5) was an example of this: the verb tell can be used in the first-person plural future perfect (we all shall have told), but it's hard to imagine many circumstances in which one would need to.

Despite the complex math in the paper, Yang's manuscript is more than worth the read.

Class Notes: Why linguistic judgments are fuzzy

Buried towards the end of a 1991 paper by Fisher, Gleitman & Gleitman is a strikingly useful -- and I think, correct -- observation on the limits of grammaticality studies. In the context of a broader argument that people learn the meanings of verbs partly from the syntactic frames the verbs appear in ("syntactic bootstrapping"), they argue that exactly this "feature" of verb learning makes it sometimes hard to decide if a particular verb is grammatical in a certain context.

Consider the present progressive in English. Classically, the present progressive can only be used for ongoing activities (1-3), not completed activities (4) or states that aren't typically activities (5):

(1) Sarah is eating the carrot.
(2) Sarah is running to the store.
(3) Sarah is looking at the moon.
(4) *Sarah is breaking the vase.
(5) *Sarah is seeing the moon.

However, a lot of people's judgments about (4) and (5) are iffy. They don't sound nearly so ungrammatical as (6).

(6) The boys carrot eats.

The idea is that people are influenced by the syntactic frame the verb appears in and reinterpret the verb. That is, if you think of "breaking" as something that happens in an instant, it isn't an activity and you can't say (4). However, if you imagine a long, drawn-out process in which Sarah methodically destroys a vase, "break" is now an activity, and (4) is fine. Similarly, "see" usually describes an end-state of some process, but you can re-imagine it as an activity (maybe Sarah observes the moon regularly as part of her profession).

I run into this constantly in my study of verbs of psychological state. Influenced by a paper by Liina Pylkkanen's 1991 "On stativity and causation," I've been pursuing the argument that certain psych verbs can't appear in certain syntactic frames. For instance, "love" and "hate" can't appear in the present progressive. In a sense, this seems right; (7) and (8) are somewhat more odd than (9) and (10).

(7) *John is loving the Red Sox.
(8) *John is hating the Yankees.
(9) John is frightening the squirrels.
(10) John is angering the chickens.

Unfortunately, one can usually find a way of reinterpreting "love" and "hate" such that they are activities  and then (7) and (8) don't sound so bad. This has made testing the hypothesis difficult. In addition, English appears to be changing to allow more psych verbs in the present progressive (darn you, McDonalds).


-------
Fisher, C., Gleitman, L. R., & Gleitman, H. (1991). On the semantic content of subcategorization frames. Cognitive Psychology, 23, 331-392.

Class Notes: This field confuses the hell out of me. I want to start from scratch.

I have now read 44 papers in the course of this semester's Language Acquisition seminar. The only firm conclusion I have come to is that language is so complicated that nobody could ever possibly learn one.



---
(The title of this post comes from the caption of a doodle of a mid-century Harvard psychologist, now enshrined in a display case on the 9th floor of William James Hall. Based on the time period, I think the doodler was either George Miller or Roger Brown, but I can't recall for sure.)

Class Notes: A Developmental Paradox

One thing that keeps coming up in artificial grammar studies (in which people are taught bits of made-up languages) is that adults are much better at learning them than kids. Yet we know that if you wait 20 years, people who started learning a real language as a kid do much better than those who started as adults. This might mean the artificial grammar studies aren't ecologically valid, but I think it's also the case that in real-life second-language acquisition, adults start out ahead of kids. Whatever makes kids better language learners seems to be something that happens after the first few weeks/months of learning.